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Introduction to the Study 
"According to the National Committee against Mental Illness, 
society's share of the over-all cost of mental illness in 1960 was 
$3,624,831,357" (McMurray, 1962). McMurray (1962) also notes that 
mental illness costs industry an additional 3 billion dollars due to 
high labor turnover, excessive absenteeism, substandard production, and 
poor employee morale. Thus the cost of mental illness in the United 
States is approximately 6 billion dollars a year. The scope of the 
problem is suggested by statistics released from the American Hospital 
Association in 1963. This report notes that 51 percent of the patients 
comprising the average daily census in all hospitals are patients under 
psychiatric care, i.e., approximately 700,000 people are hospitalized 
due to some form of mental illness (London and Rosenhan, 1968). 
The incidence of mental illness in the general non-hospitalized 
population also indicates the scope of the mental illness problem. 
Several different incidence figures are available; London and Rosenhan 
(1968) suggest that "the more intensive the effort to discover psychiat-
ric cases, the higher the resulting rates of mental disturbance" 
(p. 429). 
For example, a study conducted in Baltimore during the early 1950's 
estimated that 11 percent of the non-institutionalized population 
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exhibited "obvious mental illness." However, an intensive study of 
the Midtown Manhattan population conducted at the same time as the 
Baltimore study found that 23 percent of the population was seriously 
impaired psychiatrically; this study also found that only 18 percent 
of the population studied was "essentialy free from symptoms!" (London 
and Rosenhan, 1968). 
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The exact incidence of mental illness is not important for the 
present study; but the reader should note that all incidence studies 
agree that mental illness is affecting a sizable proportion of the popu-
lation of the United States. 
In the last ten years community mental health centers have emerged 
as a viable force for the prevention, detection, and early intervention 
of mental illness. Community mental health centers are trying to break 
away from the pattern of sending the mentally ill away to large state 
hospitals. Under this pattern the mentally ill remain in the community 
for treatment. This approach necessitates that the mental health 
professionals become,involved with local community organizations, 
e.g., churches, police, welfare agencies, industry, the courts, and 
public officials. 
One of the chief aims of a community mental health center is to 
prevent and reduce the incidence of mental illness; these centers also 
strive to promote mental health in the community. It is customary to 
divide prevention into three areas: primary prevention, secondarr pre-
vention, and tertiary prevention (Zax and Cowen, 1972). There are two 
aspects of primary prevention; primary prevention involves preventing 
the development of mental disorders, and at the same time, it attempts 
to promote psychological health and emotional adjustment. Primary 
prevention efforts are broadly directed at the whole community; they 
attempt to change the factors in a,community,which contribute.to 
psychological dysfunction. 
Sandford (1965), Cowan ai:id Zax (1967), and Caplan (1964) "all 
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agree that. the core methodologies of secondary. prevention are early 
identification of dysfunction in individuals and early effect::(.ve 
treatment" (Zax and.Cowen, 1972, p. 451). Thus secondary prevention 
hopes to reduce the incidence of mental dysfunction by shortening the 
duration of mental disorders which occurred in spite of efforts at 
primary preventic;,n. "Ideally early detection should lead to prompt 
intervention. This objective lies at the very heart of the community 
mental health center approach"·. (Zax and Cowen, 1972, p. 541). Secondary 
prevention can be attempted in two different ways. If a client can be, 
contacted early in a crisis .or episode of dysfunction, it may be possi-
ble to reduce the severity of his dysfunction. The second approach is 
to contact the client early in his life, ~·efore the dysfunction becomes 
chronic (Zax and Cowen, 1972). 
The aim of tertiary preyention is to restore mentally ill people 
to at least a minimal level of functioning. Tertiary prevention deals 
exclusively with already disturbed individuals. Zax and Cowen (1972) 
argue effectiyely that.tertiary prevention is not really prevention 
at all. They are not arguing aijainst tertiary prevention, but merely 
noting that calling it prevention leads to confusion. 
Community mental health centers are designed primarily for primary 
and secondary prevention; thus for a community mental health center to 
be.successful, it must deal with community members and local organiza-
tions. Zax ai:id Cowen (1972) suggest that the average citizen is still 
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suspicious of the mental health profession, and that he is reluctant 
to admit to any mental health problems. Knowledge of mental health might 
eliminate this attitude. 
Statement of the ProblE;mi 
In the P@-l!>formance of his joq, the community mental health specia-
list or the connnunity psychologist must communiGate with.many of the 
inhabitants of the connnunity. This dialogue will involve the concept 
of "mental health" ,and mental health related terms. Connnt,1nication 
would be,enhanced if all members.of the community shared a common mean-
ing for "mental health" and mental health related terms. However, it 
needs to be determined if community members share the same connotative 
meaning of "mental health." 
A new community mental health center will have its first inter-
actions with the community leaders; connnunity leaders will also play a 
central role throughout the life of the community mental health center. 
Therefore, the present author selected three groups of community leaders 
for study: businessmen, educators, and engineers. These groups.were. 
chosen because of their diverse backgroun4s and respective differences 
in familiarity with "mental health terms." 
The present study will determine if businessmen, educators, and 
engineers share.the same connotative meaning for mental health related 
terms. If a difference in the connotative meaning of mental health 
terms exists for different groups of community members, then the diverse 
groups chosen for the present study should exhibit this difference. 
The connotative meaning of "mental health" concepts was measured by the 
subject's response to a semantic differential, and thus "meanins" in 
the present study will always refer only to connotative meaning. 
The community psychologist not only needs to know if groups in his 
community share the same meaning for "mental health terms," but he also 
needs to know what the laymen in his community mean by mental health. 
Thus the present study will also describe what the connotative meaning 
of "mental health" is for different groups of laymen and also describe 
the attitude of these groups toward "mental health." 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the _literatu~e on mental health from four. 
different perspectives: the psychological perspective, the educational 
perspective, the business perspective, and the engineering perspective. 
The Psychological Perspeci;:ive of Mental Health 
Offer and Sabshin (1966) synth~size all of the perspectives on 
mental health into four functional persfectives which they feel account 
for most.of the viewpoints of mental health. They use the term 
"'normali~y" in place of the term "mental health.I' These four perspec-
tives are: (1) "normality as healtq," (2) "normality as utopia," 
(3)"normality as average;" and (4) "normality as process." These four 
perspectives provide a clear conceptual framework for mental health. 
They will be used as the basis for a review of the psychological per-
spective of mental health. 
The normality as health perspective 
••• includes the.traditional medical-psychiatric approach, 
whicq equates normality with health and views health as 
an almost universal phenomenon •. Many investigators have 
assumed behavior to be.within normal limits wh~n no mani7 
fest pathology was present ·(Offer and Sabshin~ 1966, p. 99). 
This practice of making gros~ observations about the health of the 
patient grew out of nineteenth centuny medicine when epidemics were 
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still flourishing throughout the world. If a physician diagnosed that 
a patient was.healthy, this indicated that the patient was functioning 
reasonably well; it did not indicate.that the patient was in a state of 
optimal functioning. This definition ot health has continued to the 
present and is,a source of confusion. Theorists from the "normality 
as utopia" perspe·ctive use health to !l'ltean optimum functioning (Offer 
and Sabshin, 1966). 
Redlich (1957) notes that psychiatrist;s do not agree amongst 
themselves about.the meaning of "health." He believes this occt.1rs 
because there is · no universally accepted theory of human beha.vior. 
The prime weakness of the medi.cal model, as applied to mental health 
problems, lies in the comparison of physical illness with psy~hological 
dysfunction (Zax and Cowen, 1972). 
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"Normality as utopia" is the second·perspective proposed by Offer 
and Sabshin (1966); it is best typified by the psychoanalyst who 
"conceives of normality as that harmonious and optimal blending of.the 
diverse elements of the mental apparatus that culminates .in optimal 
functioning or 'self-actualizatioll'111 (Offer and Sabshin, 1966, p. 102). 
The goal of the psychoanalyst is to move the client toward a set of ideal 
goals, e.g., a healthy character structure, freer access to his uncon-
scious, freedom from infantile conflicts, and development of his poten-
tial. These goals should be contrasted with the goals of the psychia-
trist who accepts the "normality as h~alth" perspective; the goal of 
the psychiatrist is to remove symptoms and.to eliminate suffering. 
The major distinguishing feature of the "normality as ut;opia" per-
spective is the assertion that the goals of therapy are.ideals which 
are rarely if ever attained, bu~ these goals are still useful as a mea-
sure of the success of treatment. Proponents of this view are Freud, 
Jones, Eisler, and Money-Kryle. 
Many psychologists would also agree with the basic assumptions of 
this perspective, e.g., Maslow, Rogers, Goldstein, Buhler, Shostrum, 
and Jahoda. For example, Rogers (1951) hopes that his client will 
become a "fully functioning person." The "fully functioning person" 
will have these characteristics: 
1. He will be open to experience. 
2. His self structure will be congruent with his 
experience. 
3. His self structure will change as he assimilates new 
experience. 
4. He will experience himself as the locus of 
evaluation. 
5. He will have.no conditions of worth. 
6. He will live with others in the maximum possible 
harmony. 
Jahoda (1959) has reviewed the psychological literature on mental 
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health and has selected six cardinal aspects of "positive mental health" 
which she feels can be empirically proven. These characteristics are: 
1. Self-perception, i.e. attitudes toward the self, self 
concept and identity 
2. Self-actualization: growth, development, and the extent 
to which the individual uses his abilities, · 
3. Integration, i.e., the extent.to which the psychic 
forces are balanced, 
4. Autonomy 
5. Perception of reality, i.e., relative freedom from need 
distortion 
6. Environmental mastery, i.e., the ability to love; work, 
play, and adequacy in interpersonal relationships and 
efficiency in problem solving. 
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Wright (1971) attempted to verify empirically Jahoda's six charac-
teristics. He .used a sociometric rating scale to generate his data~ 
He found that a four factor structure was cqnsistently revealed by a 
factor analysis of the data. His. first factor (perceptual effectiveness 
and task effectiveness) accounted for three of Jahoda's characteristics 
(self-perception, environmental mastery, and perception of reality). 
His second factqr (autonomy and self-actualization) collapsed these 
two Jahoda characteristics into a single factor. None of his four 
factors used Jahoda's characteristic of integration. Wright's (1971) 
study also found two other factors: commitment and openness. This 
study provides only partial suuport for Jahoda's theory. 
The "normality as average" perspective is the third perspective 
to be discussed. It is based on the statistical concept of normality, 
i.e., measurements on individuals will fall evenly below and above the 
mean and most of these measurements will cluster around the mean. This 
approach developed from the emphasis in psychology on tests and measure-
ments. This approach assumes that normality is desirable. For example, 
a person can have either too much or too little affect or on the 
Rorschach he can respond with either too much or too little color. 
All of the above responses would be abnormal according to the "normality 
as average" perspective (Offer and Sabshin, 1966). 
The "normality as average" perspective applies very well to biology 
and medicine. For example, a person will be ill if he has either too 
. ;¥. 
high a basal metabolism or too low a basil metabolism. The person will 
be classified normal or heal thy if his metabolism falls in the middle .. 
range. However, the "normality as a.verage'' perspective does not fit 
well with psychological data. It is true that many human characteristics 
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fit a normal distribution, but a problem arises in the interpretation 
of a person's place in the distribution •. For example, a high IQ is 
abnormal by definition, but this characteristic is not undesirable. It 
is this value judgment of desirability that makes the "normality as 
average" perspective ill suited to psychology (Offer and Sabshin, 1966). 
The fourth perspective "normality as process" 
.•. stresses that normal behavior is the end result of inter-
acting systems that change over time.... Those who advo-
cate this position insist that normality be viewed from the 
standpoint of temporal progression (Offer and Sabshtn, 1966, 
p. 108). 
This position is essentially a developmental one, i.e •. the stress is 
placed on the fact that the characteristics of mental health change as 
the person ages. Erickson's eight stages of development and Having-
hurst's developmental tasks are the best examples of this viewpoint 
(Offer and Sabshin, 1966). 
lhe Educational Perspective of Mental Health 
The school has a tremendous potential for influencing the mental 
health of students. The child spends several hours a day for 180 to 
190 days a year in school--if the child graduates from high school, 
this is approximately 15,000 hours spent in school. "The care and 
training offered by the school is exceeded only by that provided by 
the home.and is far beyond that offered by almost any other community 
agency" (Ringness, 1968, p. 23). 
Mental health .concepts can pervade the curriculum or the faculty 
might regard mental health concepts as foreign to the academic pursuits 
of school. The wide variability in the acceptance of mental health 
concepts in the schools has resulted in many educational perspectives 
of mental health. The most important perspectives from the standpoint 
of the present study are·those.approaches which $tress primary and 
secondary intervention. 
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Programs of secondary prevention are much more collllllon than programs 
for primary prevention •. Allinsmith and Goet:tials (1962) $Uggest four 
types of students which might ~e helped by secondary intervention. 
(1) Students with serious difficulties: It is difficult for school 
officials to ignore this type 9f studen.t; he may bf;!. retarded or.have 
severe emotional problems. In most cases he di$rupts the normal 
classroom routine. (2) Student~·who are underachieving academically: 
Thes~ students often have·· emotional conflicts or motivat.ional diffi-
culties. (3) Students with eniotional problems not interfering with 
school.performance: "Included here are.those troubled students whose 
torments -can be readily ignore4 by the school since the~r behavior 
does not impede the scbool~s instructional or custodial functions" 
(p. 40). (4) Students for whom there is a prospect o:i: future illness: 
This includes students who have·personality characteristics which are 
indicative of future,probl~s or students with decision problems, e.g., 
vocational choice (Allinsmith and Goethals, 1962). 
Allinsmith and Goethals (1962) review seven steps or.levels of 
intervention which might be u_sed in secondary prevention: detection, 
diagnosis and prognosis, first aid, referral, treatment, r~habilitation, 
and follow-up. Detection occurs when, it is noti,e.ed that a child is 
disturbed, upset, chronically unhappy, functioning below his capacity 
or has characteristics that indicat.e future problems. The teacher, 
parents, peers, or .the person himself are the most likely persons to 
detect dysfunction. Early detection is of: prime importance •. 
Many authorities believe that it is easier to treat child-
hood disturbances during the years-before five- or six when 
the child is amenable·to outside influences because his 
neurotic ways of reacting are less crystalized (p. 43). 
A clear implication is that efforts of detection should 
not be solely passive •. ·.Ratherthan wait until a child's 
difficulties happen to be-noticed·or to become manifest, 
it is obviously desirable to be alert and notice purpose-
fully (p. 44) . · 
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The best alternative would be to set up a systematic screening procedure 
to examine all of the children in a school (Allinsmith and Goethals, 
1962). 
Diagnosis and prognosis provide the basis·for later decisions in 
the secondary prevention process. 
Diagnosis provides confirmation of detection and attempts 
to add a "because" statement: "The child is upset because." 
Prognosis constitutes a prediction about the course of the 
illness, e.g., the disturbance will go away by itself or 
that it will continue and have some adverse consequences 
in later years (p. 42) 
When a diagnosis or prognosis are allowed to remain implicit, the 
chances for constructive action are lowered; this situation arises 
because the therapist does not completely explore the problem. Thus 
diagnosis and prognosis should always be made explicit (Allinsmith, 
and Goethals, 1962). 
Allinsmith and Goethals (1962) note that psychological first 
aid is not usually included as an intervention procedure, but "it ought 
to be included in any discussion of emotional healing because many 
acts loosely considered as attempts at treatment or prevention are 
better viewed as first aid" (p. 55). First aid is usually performed 
by nonprofessional adults who have a rudimentary knowledge of mental 
health principles. Like physical first a:i.d the goal of psychological 
first aid is to minimize suffering and to prevent the dysfunction from 
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becoming more serious. First aid is designed fornormal children and 
adults who encounter normal developmental crises .• 
First aid is generally called for in two types of situations: 
situations ·that cause physical injury or arouse the.fear of injury or 
death and situations that cause the loss of a valued. relationship or 
the threat of separation from needed or loved people. The major 
technique of first aid is reassurance· and explanation;. it is important 
to relieve the child of the stress· of the illDllediate.situation and to 
let him express rather than suppress his-feelings (Allinsmith and 
Goethals, 1962). 
Referral is the process of directing a client to a suitable person 
or agency who can help him with his problem. Re~erral is the next step 
in the intervention process. It is important that; teachers and other 
collDllunity representatives, e.g., clergy, know where to refer people in 
need. This will reduce unnecessary delays and insure that the people 
in need will receive proper tr.eatment. Allinsmith and Goethals· (1962) 
recommend that a community or school program be inaugurated to instruct 
key personnel in the referral process. 
Treatment is the next step in the intervention process; it is a 
broader term than psychotherapy and includes all actions possible in 
the management of a case. "Treatment becomes an issue when first aid 
has not solved the difficulty or is inapplicable because the disorder 
was not of recent origin" (p. 62). Allinsmith and Goethals (1962) 
list six general methods·of treatment. 
1. Reduce a person's feelings of tension and conflict 
(without necessarily changing their sources)--
supportive therapy. 
2. Eliminate external squrc~s of tension and conflict. 
3. Restrict the ways a person expresses his tensions and 
inner conflicts (without necessarily reducing their 
degree). 
4. Help person acquire the skills or the understanding 
of a problem that will enable him to eliminate sources 
of his tension conflict. 
5. Help person to see himself as others do so that he 
realizes his problem and becomes able to recognize 
occasions when his·behavior is inappropriate. 
6. Increase a person's self-understanding by helping him 
recognize more accurately his own feelings and motives. 
Rehabilitation is the next step in the intervention process, It 
involves problems of returning the patient to his normal duties; e.g., 
the child who has been in a special program for remedial reading. 
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Not all people who have been treated need rehabilitation. The need for 
rehabilitation depends on the patient and the type of treatment he has 
received (Allinsmith and Goethals, 1962). 
Follow-up consists of following a case for a period of time without 
treatment. During this period the effects of the treatement are 
assessed. If treatment has been ineffective, treatment may be revised 
and continued. Follow-up is the last step in the intervention process 
and is often overlooked. 
Cowen (1971) notes that 
Schools, as social institutions that significantly shape 
the development of all human beings in.modern society, are 
potentially ideal settings for preventive intervention. 
Since the beginning of the current century, mental health 
professionals have been performing a variety of clinical 
services in American schools, reflecting two basic assump-
tions: (1) the schools have bot4 the responsibility and 
the potential for promoting the.child's psychological as 
well as his educational well being and (2) that these two 
spheres of development are intimately intertwined--i. e. 
psychologicalmalada_ptationencourages educational failure 
and vice versa (p. 723). 
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Glidewell and Swallow (1969) found that approximately 30 percent of 
all children have problems adapting to school wh.ich range from mild to 
severe. The magnitude of this problem indicates that new solutions 
must be tried. Cowen (1971) sensed this problem and began a long range 
program for the early detection and prevention of school maladaptation 
in 1958. This program, the Primary Mental Health Project (PMHP), has 
continued for the last ,16 years. Traditionally mental health efforts 
had been at the ·secondary level; Cowen believed that his limited 
resources could be.better used for early detection .and prevention at 
the primary level. 
The PMHP began with a school psychologist and a school social 
worker working full time in the primary grades of a single school in 
Rochester, New York. The students were divided into two clinical 
groups: children in the "red tag" group had already manifested some 
dysfunction or dysfunction seemed imminent for them. The non-red tag 
group had adjusted adequately to school. The designation of red tag 
was a private research diagnosis by which the researchers hoped to 
avoid labeling the child. About a third of the children were classi-
fied as red tag. Zax et al. (1968) found that without intervention 
the dysfunction of the red tag students continued. 
Cowen (1971) modified the role of the mental hygiene personnel; 
in the initial and later stages of the PMHP the professional personnel 
abandoned the role of one-to-one therapy and began efforts to educate 
the school personnel, perform consulting functions, and act as resource 
people. Cowen (1971) notes: 
The two key conclusions emerging from our,initial work 
were that (1) ineffective function can accurately be 
identified early in the child's school career and, with-
out intervention, it has serious later consequences and 
(2) there are significant positive effects along several 
important dimensions of an early secondary prevention 
program (p. 725). 
During the second phase of the PMHP, Cowen introduced non-· 
professional aides into the program; these aid~s were hired on a half-
time basis to work regularly with children who were experiencing 
difficulties. Six housewives who were "judged to be warm, natural, 
interpersonally adept, themselves effective mothers, with a strong 
interest in working with children," were selected as child-aides 
(Cowen, 1971, p. 726). An intensive six week training program was 
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set up to give the aides an understanding of s~hool adjustment problems. 
The training program emphasized a way of thinking about school adjust-
ment problems and tried to minimize the aides anxiety aqout working 
with maladapting children. 
The key to the success of this program was the strong commitment 
of the aides and the extended.intimate contact with the children. The 
use of non-professional aides.has several other advantages. Five 
aides can be employed for the same salary as one professional; thus 
five times as many children can be seen. This frees the professional 
to work with the child whom only he can treat; it also frees him for 
consultation and education. Also the children receive faster and more 
extensive help than would be possible otherwise. Sobey (1970) gives 
ample evidence that the non-profeE;lsional aide performs well and improves 
service to the client. 
The PMHP has be.en expanded in its latest phase to eleven primary 
schools in the Rochester area; this; is approximately 4,100 students. 
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During the 1970-71 school year 700 students were seen by aides; this is 
about 17 percent of the total enrollment and includes most of the chil~ 
dren who were having school problems (Cowen, 1971). 
Despite the effectiveness of secondary prevention, e.g., the PMHP 
project, Caplan and Grunbaum (1967) note that: 
••• primary prevention is the most.desirable and potentially 
effective solution of the problem of mental. disorder in our 
communities. At _the present, however, primary prevention is 
clearly more a hope, than a reality (p. 332) •. 
Bower (1964) notes th+ee reasons for the lack -of progress in primary pre-
ventioµ. Manye~erts believe the problem is of such extreme magnitude 
that nothing can be accomplish,ed until our society has a complete over-
haul, Also .the public, in general, resists attempts at primary preven-
tion because many·of them feel that. their personal privacy is .being 
invaded. Finally the "work values" of our·society are.opposed to primary. 
prevention, i.e. , our society believes that hard work wil.l be rewarded 
with success. The prevailing mores would hold that.if a person is 
unsuccessful or unhappy, then he has only himself to blame. 
Caplan and Grunbaum (1967) suggest a conceptual model for primary 
prevention. They note,that a person's mental health is a function of 
both long term and short term factors which reduce a person's ability . 
to adapt. 
Over the long term, the likelihood of psychological dys-
function is increased if specific basic res6urces are not 
adequately provided for the population; these. resources 
may be classified as physical, psychological, and socio-
cultural. A program of. primary prevention will seek to 
evaluate these.resources and ensure.their optimal provis-
ion in the. population (p. 333). 
The short term factors which this model incil.udes are the pattez:ns 
of adaptation the person exhibits tq developmental and situational life 
crises. 
These crises represent transition points, at each of which 
the person may move nearer or further away.from adaptive 
patterns of functioning. Primary prevention efforts are 
often directed toward modifying the field of fo.rces at 
times of crisis in the belief that efforts may be more 
effectively and more efficiently applied at those times 
(Caplan .and Grunbaum, 1967, p. 333). 
Thus in the short term, primary prevention deals with crises. 
A crisis is a normal or unusual transiti.on which necessitates inte:t;'-
personal and intt:apsychic readjustment. Sometimes.an individual faces 
an immediate problem from which he cannot·~scape and which is beyond 
his capacity to solve. This results in a temporary disequilibrium 
and marked psyc_hological upset. Some common crises are: bereavement, 
the reaction of parents .to the birth of a child, surgery, moving into 
a new community, especially in a foreign country, newly married, 
birth of a sibling, entering school for the .first time, being fired 
from your job • 
A crisis usually arises from a marked change in a person's life. 
which requires him to adapt. 
The internal changes may be developmental or due to ill-
ness or trauma, while the eJCternal changes involve (a) 
the loss of a significant person or source of need grati-
fication, (b) the threat of loss, (c) a challenge which 
threatens to overtax adaptive capacities (Caplan and 
Grunbaum, p. 340). 
Feelings of frustration and helplessness are common; a crisis·can last 
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for up to four.to six wee'ks. It is important to note·that the mechanism 
the person uses to cope with problems is likely to be used again. Thus 
the person.has the potential forlearning healthy responses from each 
crisis; guiding the person to choose the.healthy response is one goal 
of primary prevention. The other.goal is to reduce the severity of the 
crisis. 
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Bower. (1964) suggests that the stress produced by a crisis be used 
to teach healthy coping behavior and thus raise the person's tolerance 
to stress. He outlines a program for moderating the stress involved 
in the child's first entrance to school. 
Ojemann (1961) obsefved that the ordinary school child engages in 
what he called "surface thinking/' i.e •. , the person r~acts simply 
and automatically to the overt, problem. In contrast.to llsurface think,-
ing" Oj emann advocates . the "causal approach ;11 in this approach the 
student looks beyond the surface of the problem and attem.pts to deter-
mine .the causes of the prol:>lem.. Then he systematically works out a 
plan of action to deal with the most.crucial cause, Ojemann trained 
children in his. methods and observed that these children had a greater 
capacity to persevere in the face of ambiguity and an in.creased 
tolerance for frustration when compared to children from a traditional 
curriculum. 
Ojemann (1961) drastic~lly redesigned the. curriculum so that stu ... 
dents could learn and practice his -methods. This nec.essitates the 
question: Should mental ·health be.one of the functions. of the school? 
Whit.e (1965) argues ·that sc~ools are for the acquisiUon of knowledge 
and cognitive skills. She·stresses that.we choose.between mental 
health and education, noting that the position we c'boose depends upon 
our values. Allinsmith and Goethals·.(1962) label thi!:i position "neo-
fundamentalism," i.e, "teachers are.enjoined to stic~ to instruction 
and schools are urged to restrict their burgeoaing nonacademic func-
tions" (p. 37). Tpey also discues four other connnon viewpoints on 
mental health in the curriculum: (1) a focus on traditional subject 
, 
matter; (2) an emphasis upon life adjustment, i.e., learning social and 
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vocational skills _in· order to earn a living; (3) the seeking of a healthy · 
pet;sonality for every child, Le., intellectual and vocational programs 
are.secondary to making the studeg.t an integrated, matut"e ·person, and 
(4) the -improvement of society through increased maturity .of ,individuals, 
i.e., this approach carries .apprc.Jach (3) a step farther--if all students 
are integrated and clarify .their. values, thes~ healthy ,individuals 
will nqt need wa:i., and thue1 society.and civilization will be s_aved. 
Allinsmith and Goethalr;; (1962) adopt none.of these positions, but 
rather advocate that mental health and cognitive objectives coexist. 
with more.emphasis upon the cc;ignitive objectives. They urge that the 
teacher play an important.role.in mental health, but they caution that 
his. role, be a restri.cted role in which the teacher is aware of his 
limitat.ions. This --is also ,the position adopted by the present author •. 
The Business .Perspec::tive of Mental Health 
The mental health problems encountered by industry ·are different 
frQm the mental health problems of e4ucation. The major mental health 
problems of industry ai:e: absenteeism, alchoholism, accidents, high 
job turnover -rates, job dissatisfaction,. the _personality problems of 
employees. Loban (1966) notes that "emotional illness causes mo;-e · 
absenteeism thall any other illness except·the common cold" (p. 29). 
Levinson (1961) reports that. absenteeism cQsts. indu1;1try .$9 billion 
dollars each year .and suggests t4at at leas.t half of this .illness was· 
psychosomatic. 
Industrial acc.idents were not ·as expensive a problem as absenteeism 
(estimated cost,of $3 billion each year), but industrial accidents 
were "responsi.ble for 15,000 deaths and two million disabling injuries . 
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each year" (Levinson~ 1961, p. 36) .. Levinson (1961) also reports that 
80 to 90 percent of these accidents were. psychological in origin. 
Zimmerman (1960) reports that Caterpillar Tractor has adopted the policy 
of issuing sick leave to employees who seem disturbed. The management 
hopes this policy will result in fewer accidents and increased 
production. 
The employee's personality .is also a major ,industrial problem. 
Loban (1966) notes th~t: 
Eighty percent to .90 percent of d,ismissa.ls today·are· 
attributed to social incompetence, the inability to get 
alortg with people. Ten percent to 20 percent are defined 
as technical incompetence (p. 29). 
Gaudet and Carli (1957) agre.e andsuggest that personality factors 
are signific~nt causes of an.industrial manager's job failure. 
Howe"Ver, Gaudet (1962) notes that certain personality disturbances 
also. result in job success. For example, the obsessive-compulsive 
who works for quality control, accounting, or drafting. Gaudet 
(1962) urges that we pay less attention to the individual's pathology 
and pay mqre attention .to the defenses the person uses to cope.with 
his patho],ogy. He suggests that t}:J.ese,defenses m~y be assets instead 
of liab ili ti.es . 
Levinson (1961) suggests: 
•••• that so long as work is.a central organizing point of 
a man's life, as it presently is in our.society, where and 
how he works will have a significant effect .on his mental 
health. What management does ,or does not do in every 
sphere of activity involving employees affects their mental 
health as surely as the motor of an automobile affects the. 
way the whole car functions' (p. 4.1-). 
Industry's efforts to improve the men ta], hea,l.th of its employees have 
been concentrated on secondary. prevention;. little has been done. in the 
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area of primary prevention. Industrial efforts at secondary prevention 
have been meager in comparison to education's efforts and in comparison 
to the scope and cost of the pro~lem. 
There has been a philosophical change in the industrial viewpoint 
of mental illness. Until recently industry believed that mental illness 
was the individual's personal problem and that.the "blame" or responsi-
bility for this problem rested with the in.dividual. Levinson (1961) 
notes that industry is beginning to·acknowledge that mental health is 
a function of the individual's working environment aIJ..d his own.personal-
ity. The present author suggests that this attitude change is a 
necessary prerequisite before industry will spend money and effort.on 
the. mental health problem. 
Industry has made.several efforts at secondary prevention. Cater-
pillar Tractor's policy of sick leav.e for emotional problems has already 
been discussed. In some cases policy changes can improve the employee's 
mental health and the working environment, For example, Zimmerman 
(1960) tells about one company whic.h was plagued by a very high acc;:ident 
rate. This company had the rigid policy .of ,firing an employee after one· 
accident. When this policy was.rescinded, the employees relaxed, and 
the accid,ent rate. declined. Zimmerman (1960) also suggests that .the 
employees .be provided with individualized treatment; this might be, 
accomplished by,setting up "inter-company groups to employ and use the 
services of a full ti,me psychiatrist" (p. 6). Dauw (1968) also argues 
for early detection and intervention for neurotic executives. 
Dauw .{1968) suggests that,corpora,tions control powerful reinforcers 
and that unconsciously thes~ reinforcers are applied to shape attitudes,· 
values, and behavior. Da,u,w (1966) urges that these reinforcers be 
consciously controlled, and used as socializing forces. For example, 
Dauw suggests .. that. top executives could be .motivated to accept therapy 
through fear of being fired. 
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The wo_rk environment -plays an impo;tant part in an employee:' s mental 
health. However, Lobon (1966) argues·that_changes in the.work environ-
ment. shoulp. not be made lightly. For example, moving the employees to 
new offices can have some unexpecte4 effects: Often employ~es develop 
helping relationships with other employees, i,. e., someone you -turn to 
when you need help. If your , off ice is move4 two blo_cks away, you . no 
longer.have easy access to tq.is pers,pn and must.cultivate new relation-
ships. A diff~rent kind of envitronmental change is assigning a new 
boss ·to a group of employees. The. employees must change their.work 
methods to satisfy this new boss •. This problem is exagerated even-
more. if the new boss is brought in from outside the company. 
One-• of the few examples of primary prevention in the business 
literature was discussed by Menninger (1960). Menninger advocates 
regular emotional checkups for executives similar _to regular physical 
checkups. The purpose,of'these checkups would be to-evaluate his 
mental health and to give the executive food for tQought. Menninger 
would evaluate four areas: (1) the quality .of his personal relation-
ships, (2) how does •he _deal with reality and accept frustration, (3) 
how free is this person of.anxiety. and tension, and (4) does this 
person receive satisfaction from giving of himself and can he accept 
help when he.needs it? 
Menninger (1960) also offers. a prel,lcription for mental health._ 
(1) Have. a periodic emotion~l. checkup. (2) Take time to review the 
past and evaluate.the present in terms of goals. (3) Schedule vacations, 
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and hobby time. (4) Unde;stan4 himself 'better--especially how he .. handles 
his hostile feel;ings. • 
Advertising~- (1973) reported an interesting attempt at primary 
prevention •.. The River .Reg:l,on Mental Health Prc;,j ect persuaded local 
industry to dona_te nearly one .million dollars ·in free .advertising 
time. The ads will ruq on television. and in ·newsp'ap.ers for 60 week.s. 
The purpose of the ads is to teach people how to deal with day·to day 
emotional problems or to seek help in the ,early stages of em.otional 
distress. 
The ·Engineering Perspective of Mental Hea.lth 
Because: of the 1close. associa.tion between engineers and business., 
''lnany of- the artic],es contained. in th~, bus:f.ne$S· perspec;ive .could have 
\ 
appeared in the ,present section, and cortverse],y, all of the articl;es 
in thi~ section ,could have. bee1;1; included in the business pers_pective. 
For example, Burke ·(1969) inveli!tiga~ed the,relation~hip:between.aging, · 
skill obsolescence, and· st,ress on engineers who were the managers of 
their departments. Burke (1969) .found that; for these. subj ec-ts, aging 
al).d fe~lings of -skill_. obsolesc,ence were signficantly -related to mea-
sures of stress, stra.in, and lack of ment~l health. Burke cqncluded 
that.age alone.was not·a sqffic:l,ent; explanation for the result.that 
feelings of skill obsolescence were rela;e.d to poor· mental he~lth. 
Aldridge·(l970) disc~sses some of the environmental aspects of 
the managerial .and profesaional sec,t;or~ of business which contribut;e 
to emotional illn,ess. The facto;rs. discussed b.y Aldridge are: 
(1) selecting personnel who are. incompatible with their jobs or 
assigning job funct;ions ·to an emp],oyee'which are incompatible with his 
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personality, (2) insufficient definition ·of :r;esponsibility and authority 
within the management structure, (3) frequent movement of personnel from 
one.geographic location to another, and (4) frequent and lengthy .travel. 
McLean (1966) notes .that. 
The emerging field of occupational mental health is con-
cerned with bbth the psychiatrically ill employee and with 
factors in the- .work envi:r;ortment which stfill~late mentally 
healthy behavior (p. 961). 
Most. of the present review has concentra_ted u_p·on the . ill employee and 
little attention has. been focus.ed upon enviro.nmental factors. Engineer-
ing and industry have not used mental health as a criteria for designing 
the work environment, and that is why the present review focused mainly 
upon the _ill employee. 
Hypotheses· 
The present review of the literature sugges.ted the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Because of their-different professional backgrounds and frames 
of reference, the three groups of subjects will have different 
connotative meanings for.each "mental health related term." 
Thus null hypothesis .one is.: · There will be no. difference 
between the three groups of subjects ,in the connotative meaning 
of the six concepts used in the.semantic differential. 
2. Null Hypothesis Two: The conceptual structure of mental health 
related terms will be different for the three groups of 
subjects. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
The present study was conducted in two phases: (1) during phase 
one the concepts used in the semantic differential were selected; and 
(2) during phase two the semantic differential was constructed and 
administered to ninety subjects. This chapter will begin with a 
brief disccusion of the semantic differential and then proceed to a 
discussion of phase one and phase two. 
The Semantic Differential 
The semantic differential was chosen to measure the meaning of 
mental health related concepts. However, the concept of "meaning" 
itself, is difficult to define. Meaning can be divided into two 
categories: denotative meaning and connotative meaning. Denotative 
meaning applies to the referent of a word, i.e., words are only symbols 
of "objects;" they are not the objects to which they refer. Two 
people share the same denotative meaning for an object when they both 
agree upon which object they are talking about. For example, if two 
people can look at a bolt of lightning and talk about the lightning 
then they must share the same denotative meaning for lightning 
(Osgood, 1969). 
The connotative meaning of a word is the implicit meaning of the 
word, i.e, the emotional or other reactions which are linked to the 
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word. For example, these two people might share the same denotative 
meaning for lightning, but·each one might react to, or feel differently 
about the lightning. Individual "A" might find it frightening, while 
the other could find the lightning exciting. 
The semantic differential technique measures the connotative mean-
ing, i.e. , the implicit, psychological meaning, of a concept. · Because 
meaning is one of the most important determinants of human behavior, 
the semantic differential is an extremely useful approach to investiga-
ting human behavio.r. The sema,ntic differential is based on the premise 
that the connotat~ve meaning of any concept may be represented as a 
point in semantic space. "Semantic space is a region of some unknown 
dimensionality, and Euclidian in character" (Osgood 1 Suci, and Tannen-
baum, 1957, p. 25). They suggest that if you know the dimensions of 
semantic space, and if you can measure a concept in relation to these 
dimensions, then the concept's coordinates .on these dimensions will 
measure the meaning of the concept. 
Osgood et al. (1957) have ~easured the dimensions of semantic 
space and found as many·as eight dimensions. However, three dimensions 
account for most of the common variance, i.e., not much is gained by 
using all eight dimensions, so only three dimensions of semantic 
space are commonly used. The three dimepsions most commonly resulting 
are: Evaluation, Activity and Potency. Thus when a concept is differ-
entiated with, respect to these three factors, the concept may be 
located in a three dimensional semantic space. For example, a semantic 
differential might find. that a HOUSE is good, powerful, and passive; 
thus .. the concept HOUSE has been located in semantic space. 
The meaning of a concept for .a subject or a group of sub-
jects can also be defined, and more efficiently and use-
fully, as that point·in the semantic space identified by 
its coordinates on several fl:!,ctors (Osgood et al., 1957, 
p. 89) 
Since the present study used three factors in the construction of 
the semantic differential, each of the six concepts in the semantic 
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differentiai can be represented in three dimensional Euclidian space by 
a tri-variate vector (Evaluation, Potency, Activity). This vector 
contains the factor scores for the Evaluation dimension, the Potency 
dimension, and the Activity dimensiqn. These factor scores are the 
coordinates for this concept in three dimensional space. Thus a con-
cept can be represented as a single point in three dimensional space 
(Osgood et al., 1957). 
A factor score.was computed by averaging the responses each indi-
vidual made to the four scales which represented each semantic differ-
ential dimension. For example an individual's Evaluation factor score 
was computed by averaging his response to the four·Evaluation scales, 
e.g., Good (1), Valuable (2), Pleasant (2), and Beautiful (3). 
The average of these scale responses is 2. 0, so the person's evaluat.ion 
factor score on concept X would be 2.0. 
Once it is possible .to locate a concept in semantic space by using 
the subject's factor scores as coordinates, it is also possible to 
locate.another concept in the same semantic space, and then determine 
the similarity of connotative meaning of the two concepts. 
Osgood, Suci and Tannenb.aum·. (1957) suggest that the similarity 
between the meaning of concepts can,be measured by calculating the 
linear distance between the points in semantic space, This distance 
is similar to the distance you might calculate between cities on a map. 
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Concepts which have a small distance between them are very similar in 
meaning; concepts which have a large distance between them have a 
different meaning. 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) suggested that the generalized 
distance formula of solid geometry could be used to calculate th.e 
linear distance between two concepts in semantic space. The distance 
D between two concepts is calculated by finding the difference between 
the concepts' respective factor scores, squaring this difference, 
summing the squared differences and finding the square root of this 
sum, i.e., D equals ((sul!l(differences) 2)~. 
For example, the .distance .betwE!en Concept A (1.0, ·2.5, 4.0) and 
Concept B (2.0, 1.5, 6.0) is (1.02 plus -1.02 plus 2.02)\ and (6.0)~ 
equals 2.45. The minim\_llll distance D between two concepts is aiways 
0.0, which indicates that the two concepts are identical. The 
maximum distance depends on the maxil!lum value of your measuring instru-
ment; for the semantic differential with a seven point scale, the 
maximum distance is 10.4. So, it can be seen that concepts A and 
Bare fairly similar in meaning. 
Reliability and Validity 
Two properties which any measuring instrument, e.g., the semantic 
differential, should have are reliability and validity. Reliability 
refers to the consistency with which repeated measurements of the same 
object produce the same results •. An instrument is valid when it measures 
what it intends to measure,, For ·example, the semantic differential 
intends to measure the meaning of concepts, however, simply assuming 
that.the semantic differential measures meaning does·not prove that it 
does measure meaning. The· semantic differential is a valid measure 
of meaning to the extent; that it can be . shown to measure meaning. 
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The reliability of the. semantic differential can be measured in 
three different ways: item reliability, factor score reliability, and 
concept-meaning reliability (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). Item 
reliability refers to.the reproducability of each concept-scale pair, 
i.e., does the subject give the same rating to an it.em at two different 
times. Factor-score reliability refers to the reproducability of factor-
scores under retest conditio.ns. Concept-meaning reliability refers to 
the reproducability of points in semantic space when the same measure 
operation is applied. 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) use the error of measurement 
as an indication of reliability; the smaller the error of measurement, 
the better or more reliable. the :measurement is. Luria (1953), Bopp 
(1955), and Osgood, Suci, and Tannenpau'Ql (1957) all report item 
reliabilities, i.e., errors of measurement, of approximately .70 scale 
units. Each semantic differential scale ranges from one to seven and 
the distance between any two whole numbers in this scale is called a 
scale unit. Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) state that "from the 
most conservative viewpoint, the average error of measurement wi.th the 
semantic differential is no. more than one scale unit" (p. 135). That 
is, a person is not likely. to change his response to an item by 
more than one scale unit. 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) report that factor score errors 
of measurement are even smaller than the errors of measurement for the 
individual items. In reporting on the results of Howe's and Osgood's 
(1954) study, they state that: 
Here we do not find any appreciable difference,between fac-
tors in terms of reliability. Cultural meanings of concepts 
prove to be very stable--for any f.acto.r, a shift of only 
about .4 scale units is significant at the 5 per cent 
level (p. 139) . 
All of the above findings indicate that the semantic differential is a 
reliable measuring instrument. 
Is the semantic differential a valid measuring instrument? 
Ideally, we should correlate semantic differential scores 
with some independent criteria of meaning-.;.'but there is 
no commonly accepted quantitative criterion of meaning. 
In lieu of such a criterion, we have fallen back on what 
is usually called "face validityn (Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum, '1957, p. 140). 
Face validity refers to the fact that a measuring instrument makes the 
same kind of distinctions about the data that an observer would make 
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without the aid of the measuring instrument. Osgood and Luria (1954) and 
Howes and Osgood (1954) both report high face validity. Osgood, Suci, 
and Tannenl:>aum (1957) state that: 
Throughout·our work with the semantic differential we 
have found nq reasons to question the validity of the 
instrument on the basis of its correspondence with the 
results to be expected from common sense (p. 141). 
It has been mentioned that no commonly accepted criterion for mean-
ing exists, but in several cases validity criteria of a specific nature 
are available. For example, Suci (1952), ,A.Reeves (1954), and Osgood, 
Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) all report high validity coefficients. 
Thus there seems to be considerable evidence that the semantiG differ-
ential is a valid measuring instrument for connotative meaning. 
Since the present study is very similar to many of the above.seman-
tic differential studies, the present author can see no reason toques-
tion the assumption that the present semantic differential is both 




The most important task in the development of the semantic differ-
ential was the identification of the concepts which were used in the 
analysis (Osgood et al., 1957). The present study required the selec-
tion of six concepts which were related to the concept of "mental health." 
These six concepts were chosen from a list of concepts generated by a 
Q-sort which was administered to three groups of graduate faculty 
members. 
Subjects for Phase One 
The three groups of laymen selected for study were engineers, 
educators, and businessmen. These groups were chosen for three reasons: 
(1) The members of each group are professionals, and thus, are likely 
to be the leaders in a community. The community leaders are the first 
people a connnunity mental health center would have to communicate with. 
(2) Each of these groups has a different degree of familiarity with the 
concept of "mental health." "Mental health" is a commonly used term 
in education, a moderately used term in business, and a seldomly used 
term in engineering. (3) These three groups have different professional 
orientations; the present author expected that if "mental health" had 
a different meaning for different groups of people, then this differ-
ence would be seen in these three groups of subjects. 
Target Population and Sampling. The present author planned to use 
four volunteers from the graduate faculty of the College of Education, 
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the College of Business .Administration, and the College of Engineering •. 
These faculty members could provide a better estimate of the range 
of mental health related concepts used in their professions than the 
present author could. It.was·decided that four subjects from each group 
were adequate for generating. a list of acceptable concepts. 
Two factors interacted. to make it impossible to obtain four subjects 
from each professional area. First, the present study was conducted 
during the .Summer Session of Oklahoma State University. Either the 
faculty were not present at t4e time the study was conducted or the 
present author was unable to contact the faculty members who were pre-
sent because they had unusual office hours. Second, the Q-sort was 
not an attractive task. Five subjects who agreed to take the Q-sort 
reneged; two of these subjects said they did not have the time, and the 
remaining three subjects felt ;that the Q-sort was ttpo difficult for 
them to complete. Thus phase one was conducted with three subjects 
from each of the three professional areas. Only one of these faculty 
members was female. 
~terials. The only.material used. in phase one was a Q-sort of 
mental health concepts. A Q-sort is a technique developed by Stephenson 
(1953) for reducing a set of. objects to a smaller number of subsets; 
the objects in each subset should be similar in some way. The objects 
sorted in the present study were concepts related to "mental health." 
Each subject was requested to list all of the words which he 
could think of that were related to the concept "mental health." Next 
the subject was instructed to place all the .words which were similar 
in some way together in groups. Finally, each subject was instructed 
to place a name above each group of words. (See Appendix A for the 
complete Q-sort booklet.) 
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Thus each subject generated a list of group names; unfortunately, 
these group names were not what the present author intended. The 
subjects produced group names such as "popular descriptions of mental 
disorders," "informal class descriptors," and "constructive mental 
abilities." (See Appendix B for a complete list of group names.) Since 
these terms were not what the present author was interested in, it was 
decided to use the "words related to mental health" from part one of 
the Q-sort to generate a list of concepts for use with the semantic 
differential. 
All of the responses to part one of the Q-sort for each of the 
education faculty members were grouped together to form a list of mental 
health related words for education. A list was generated in the same 
way for business. and engineering faculty. These three lists were 
used to select concepts for the semantic differential. (See Appendix C 
for a list of the words generated by each faculty.) 
Procedure. The main purpose of the Q-sort was to give the experi-
menter an idea of the range of terms used by the three groups of sub-
jects. Each group of subjects generated a list of "mental health 
related terms.II If the experimenter generated the lists of concepts 
himself, he might have restricted the range of concepts included in 
each list and thus introduced an experimenter bias into the experi-
ment. The Q-sort technique. reduced experimenter bias in the selection 
of concepts for the semantic differential. However, experimenter bias 
was not totally eliminated since ultimately the experimenter selected 
the six concepts used in the semantic differential. 
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The concepts fot the se~ant1c differential ~ere chosen on the 
basis of the following three criteria: (1) If possible the concept was 
familiar to all three groups, i.e., the concept was included in each 
of the three lists of concepts; (2) when criterion one was met, the 
concepts which occurred most frequently were chosen; and (3) concepts 
which were familiar to .each group, but which occurred infrequently, 
were also included. Criterion three was included to insure that the 
concepts chosen for the semantic differential covered the entire seman-
tic space (Osgood et al.; 1957). 
The six concepts chosen for the semantic differential were 
stability, self-confidence, adjuste4, ·self-control, crazy, and mental 
health. For the semantic differential, "stability" was e:.hange.d to 
"emotional stability" to make the concept less ambiguous. Crazy was 
included as an infrequent term under criterion three above. At least 
three of the subjects included terll!,S like crazy, insane, sick, and 
psychotic in their lists of mental health ;i:-elated words. In order 
to cover the entire semantic space of mental health related terms, 
"crazy" was included as a concept in the semantic differential. 
(See Table I for the frequencies of the selected concepts). 
· Phase Two 
Phase two consisted of constructing and administering the semantic 
differential to ninety graduate students from the Colleges of Engineer-
ing, Education, and Business Administration. 
Concept 
TABLE I 
THE FREQUENCY OF CONCEPTS SELECTED FOR THE 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL FROM THE Q-SORTS 
OF EACH GROUP OF SUBJECTS 
Engineering Education Business 
(Emotional Stability) 
Stability 2 1 1 
Self Confidence 0 1 3 
Adjusted 2 1 0 
Self Control 1 1 1 
Crazy--or 1 0 1 
(Similar Term) 4 5 7 
Mental Health 









The present author planned to take three samples of thirty subjects 
each from the Graduate Colleges of Engineering, Education and Business 
Administration. Graduate students were used to approximate the responses 
of professionals in the above fields because it was impossible to obtain 
the necessary number of subjects in each field without using students. 
Rather than mix professionals and students, it was decided to use only 
graduate students from Oklahoma State University. Faculty were chosen 
in phase one to correspond to the graduate students used in phase two. 
The responses of graduate students were a reasonable approximation 
to the responses of professionals for two reasons: (1) in many cases 
the graduate students had returned to school after having worked in 
field of interest for a number of years. Thus these students were 
similar in many ways to the professionals working in the field. (2) 
Graduate students who had not worked in their field yet, still have 
had ample time to absorb the frame of reference of their profession, 
and their connotative meaning of mental health terms should be similar 
to the connotative meaning adopted by professionals in their field. 
(See Table II for characteristics of the sample subjects.) 
Materials 
37 
The semantic differential was the only material used in phase two. 
The semantic differential consisted of a set of concepts which were 
chosen during phase one and a set of scales chosen during phase two. 
The subject was instructed to rate each concept on each bipolar scale. 
The major problem of phase two was to select the appropriate scale 
for the semantic differential. 
4 scale consisted of a bipolar adjective pair, e.g., good-bad, with 
each scale ranging from one to seven. One indicates extremely good; 
seven indicates extremely bad. Two criteria were used in the selec-
tion of scales for the semantic differential: (1) The scale was 
relevant to the concepts being judged. If the scale was irrelevant to 
the concept being judged, the subject gave the concept a neutral rating 
of four on that scale and no information was gained by using that 
scale. (2) Each scale was related to only one factor, i.e., the 
scale was factorially pure. 
Osgood et al. (1957) identified eight dimensions or factors of 
semantic space. Three of these dimensions accounted for 97 percent of 
the variance in the semantic space: Evaluation, Activity, and Potency. 
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TABLE II 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE OF SUBJECTS WHO 
RESPONDED TO THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
Descriptor Engineering Education Business 
SEX 
Male 27 15 17 
Female 1 17 11 
Non-Response 1 0 0 
TOTAL 29 32 29 
AGE 
21 1 1 
22 4 2 
23 4 4 3 
24 1 3 2 
25 3 2 2 
26 2 3 4 
27 2 3 
28 2 2 4 




33 1 3 
34 1 1 1 
35 or greater 1 2 2 
Non-Response 1 1 4 
TOTAL 29 32 29 
MAJOR 
General Engineering 2 
Industrial Engineering 12 
Electrical Engineering 2 
Mechanical Engineering 11 
Civil Engineering 1 
Agricultural Engineering 1 
English Education 1 
ABS ED 5 
Higher Education 12 
Secondary Education 7 
Elementary Education 3 
Curriculum and Instruction 3 
Business Education 13 




Non-Response 0 0 1 
TOTAL 29 32 29 
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The present experiment used only these three dimensions. Thus for a 
scale to be considered for the present experiment, it had to have a high 
factor loading on one of the above dimensions and low loadings on the 
other two dimensions. (See Table III for a list of the scales chosen 















SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES 











































The semantic differential was administered to the subjects either 
at the beginning or end of a class period. Directions for completing 
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the instrument were included with the test form; the instrument was 
designed to be self-administering. The subjects rarely asked questions 
about completing the semantic differential, and the subjects rarely 
took over five to t~n minutes to complete the instrument. (See Appendix 




Null hypothesis one stated that the~e would be no difference 
between the three groups of subjects in the connotative meanings of 
each concept, i.e. , do the six concepts have the same meaning for 
each of the three groups of subjects?. Null hypothesis one was tested 
with an x2 test of independence. (Connover, 1971). The x2 test ac~ually 
tested the hypothesis that the three distributions ·of factor scores 
were selected from the same population. Since there were six concepts 
in the semantic differential and each concept was measured by three 
factors, then each subject produced eighteen factor scores. It is 
the distribution of these individual factor scores which was tested 
with an x2 test. (These individual factor scores are contained.in 
Appendix E.) 
Eighteen x2 tests of independence were calculated; one x2 was 
calculated for each of the.eighteen factor scores. (See Table IV.) 
Each concept had an Evaluat.ion factor score, a Potency factor score, 
and an Activity factor score. 
The x2 values from each of the three factor scores on each concept 
were added together to produce an overall x2 test for each concept. 
These six x2 tests are contained in Table IV. The results of these 
overall x2 tests suggest that there is no difference between the. 
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TABLE IV 
EIGHTEEN x2 TESTS OF INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE THREE GROUPS OF FACTOR SCORES AND 
EACH CONCEPT ADDED TOGETHER TO FORM AN OVERALL x2 TEST FOR EACH CONCEPT 
Concepts Evaluation Activity Potency Overall x2 
MENTAL HEALTH 16.67 12.03 11.48 40.18* 
probability level .033 .149 .175 .05 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY 6.49 6.74 9.98 23.22 
probability level .59 .56 .265 .70 
SELF CONTROL 7.21 9.2~ 10.84 27.29 
probability level .51 .32 .21 .30 
SELF CONFIDENCE 5.10 8.83 6.12 20.05 
probability level .74 .35 .63 .80 
ADJUSTED 6.61 3.50 7.60 17. 71 
probability level .58 .89 .27** .50 
CRAZY 8.97 13.95 11.60 34.52* 
probability level .34 .082 .075** .OS 
*Significant at the .05 probability level 
**One concept category was pooled so these x2 are based on 6 degrees of freedom. All other individual 









distributions of the combined factor sco~es for the three groups on the 
following copcepts: EMOTIONAL STABILITY, SELF CONTROL, SELF CONFIDENCE, 
and ADJUSTED. Only two of the overall x2 tests were significant. The 
probability level for CRAZY was less than .05 and the probability level 
for MENTAL HEALTH was less than .05. 
Since the factor scores represent the location of a concept in 
semantic space, i.e., the meaning of a concept is represented by its 
factor scores, the present author concludes that there is no difference 
in the connotative meaning of the following concepts for the engineering, 
education, and business subjects: EMOTIONAL STABILITY, SELF CONTROL, 
SELF CONFIDENCE, and ADJUSTED. Thus each of the three groups of sub-
jects shares a connnon meaning for each of the above concepts. 
However, the present author concludes that CRAZY and MENTAL HEALTH 
do have a different meaning for each of the three groups of subjects. 
This is indicated by their significant overall x2 tests. For both of 
these concepts all possible pairwise comparisons between the.three 
2 groups were computed using .a X test. The probability level for all 
six pairwise comparisons was less than .05 in all cases. Thus it is 
concluded that the engineering, education, and business subjects have 
d:i..,tferent connotative 'tneanings for the concepts MENTAL HEALTH and 
CRAZY. 
Hypothesis Two 
It has been mentioned in Chapter III .that the similarity .in conno-
.tative meaning of two concepts can be measured by their distance Din 
semantic space. If the distances between.all six concepts are calcu-
lated, these distances can be placed in 13, six by six matrix. The D 
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matrix represents the conceptual structure of the set of six concepts; 
it indicates the similarity of all concept pairs used in the semantic 
differential. D matrices for engineering, education, and business 
were calculated. (See Table V) The D's were calculated from the 
average Evaluation, Potency, and Activity factor scores for each group. 




















THE D MATRICES FOR ENGINEERING, EDUCATION, AND 
BUSINESS SUBJECTS CONTAINING THE LINEAR 
DISTANCE BETWEEN EVERY PAIR OF CONCEPTS 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 
Engineering 
MENTAL HEALTH .654 .690 .975 .470 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY .232 .372 .693 
SELF CONTROL .169 .652 




MENTAL HEALTH .465 .481 .448 .282 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY .221 .054 .379 
SELF CONTROL .217 .294 




MENTAL HEALTH .767 .609 .651 .392 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY .444 .337 .498 
SELF CONTROL .343 .475 




















THE MEAN FACTOR SCORES AND MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
FOR EACH GROUP OF SUBJECTS ON EACH CONCEPT 
Evaluation Activity Potency 
Mean Mean Mean 
Concept Factor s.d. Factt>r s.d. Factor 
Score Score Score 
Engineering 
MENTAL HEALTH 2.27 1.26 3.12 1.13 3.96 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY 1.95 .80 3.15 .75 3.58 
SELF CONTROL 2.00 .68 2.99 .81 3.45 
SELF CONFIDENCE 1.87 .66 2.91 .81 3.37 
ADJUSTED 2.64 .98 3.10 .87 3.53 
CRAZY 5.59 1.33 3.90 .68 4.12 
Education 
MENTAL HEALTH 2.50 .1.14 3.32 .60 3.82 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY 2.08 1.12 3.21 .76 3.67 
SELF CONTROL 2.32 1.13 3.24 .77 3.64 
SELF CONFIDENCE 2.10 1.44 3.19 .76 3.67 
ADJUSTED 2.29 .96 3.50 .96 3. 77 
CRAZY 5.15 1.29 3.95 .76 3.85 
Business 
MENTAL HEALTH 2.01 .82 3.01 .95 3.92 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY 1. 75 .65 2.93 .74 3.70 
SELF CONTROL 1.82 .59 3.24 .57 3.38 
SELF CONFIDENCE 1.68 .61 2.93 .72 3.37 




















CRAZY 5.61 1.20 3.62 .99 4.57 1.19 
The D matrix for each group represents the conceptual structure of 
"mental health" for each·group. If two conceptual structures are very 
similar, the two groups will perceive the concepts in a conceptual 
structure as being alike. Hypothesis two states that the conceptual 
structur~ of "mental health" concepts will be different for the three 
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groups, i.e., uncorrelated. This hypothesis was tested by correlating 
the corresponding cells in the D matrix for two groups. There are fif-
teen different D values in each matrix; fifteen ordered pairs (Dab, 
Dab' .•.• Def, Def') were correlated with a Pearson product moment 






PEARSON PRODUCT MO;MENT .CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE D MATRICES .FOR EACH PAIR OF GROUPS 






N equals .15 






aThese means and standard deviations provide additional evidence of 
between group similarities. 
Since the correlation for all pairs of conceptual structures is 
at least .990, with 14 degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis that 
there is no linear relationship between the three possible pairs of 
groups must be rejected for each pair of groups. The probability level 
for each pair of groups is .0001. Thus it is concluded that all pairs 
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of conceptual structures are significantly related, i.e., the conceptual 
structures for all three groups are very similar. 
Comparison of the Connotative Meaning of 
Concepts Between and Withi~ Groups 
What connative meaning do the mental health concepts have for 
each group? Within each group, do concepts have similar meanings? 
How are the _three groups of subjects different in their connotative 
meanings? These three questions.will be answered descriptively; no 
statistical proof will be offered. ·A- casual glance at Table V reveals 
that for each group, five concepts are very similar in meaning: 
MENTAL HEALTH, EMOTIONAL STABILITY, SELF CONTROL, SELF CONFIDENCE, 
and ADJUSTED. Similarity is indicated by the very small DI' s between 
each of these concepts. The largest D for any of three groups is 
.97; even this Dis still very small. 
Examination of the D matrices in Table V also,indicates that all 
three groups perceive CRAZY as being different from the remaining five 
concepts. However, the present author was surprised that the distance 
between CRAZY and the other concepts was not larger. Remember, the 
maximum D possible is 10.4; the largest D between CRAZY and any of the 
other concepts was 4.2. 
Evidence for differences between· the groups has already been pre-
sented in Table IV. It was noted here that each group had a different 
connotative meaning for two out of the six concepts: MENTAL HEALTH 
and CRAZY. The three groups shared the. same connotative meaning for 
the-remaining four concepts.- Examination of the standard deviations 
in Table VI reveals that the. three groups -are equally variable in their 
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connotative meanings.· The only clearcut·difference in variability 
between the groups is· on the evaluation factor score. Education subjects 
have more variability in their factor scores than either the Buainess or 
Engineering subjects •. 
It should also be noted at,this point that despite a significant 
difference in connotative meaning between groups for the cc;,ncepts 
MENTAL. HEALTH and CRAZY, that.the magnitude of this difference was not 
very large. The largest difference between two ·average factor scores 
was .72 scale units, i.e., two groups perceived the .concept differently· 
but on a.semantic.differential seven poin,t scale, tqis difference·in 
meaning would be slightly less than one scale point, 
Finally, the connotative meanings ,of th.e different concepts need 
to be.described. This description will be drawn from the average 
factor .scorres ·in. Table VI. Table VI actua].ly gives the most accurate 
description of· the concept's :connotative meanill,gs, but a verbal des,-
criptiop. •might also be useful. 
Figure 1 is a graphical presentat:i,on of the data in Table VI; the 
factor scores have been transfc;,:rmed from n,umbers to points on·a bar 
graph., The three different fact.or. scores (Evaluation, Activity, and 
Potency). are presented by three different symbols. Thus each concept 
has th.ree bar graphs associated, with. it. These bar graphs are on the . 
same line and to. the right of the concepts. Each bar. represents th.e .. 
interval which just: includes all three. groups' factor .scores. For 
example, the average ,MENTAL HEALTH; Evaluation factor scar.es for -each 
group were: Engineering (2.47), Education (2.50),: and Business (2.01). 
The interval which includes all th.ree factor ·scores .is .from 2.01 .to 
2.50; thu~ the bar graph for the MENTAL HEALTH Evaluation factor extends 
49 
from 2.01 to 2.50. This interval could ha..ve been read approximately 
from the semantic differerit!al scale at the botto~ of Figure 1. However, 
the graph was not intended for this purpose. 
MENTAL HEALTH - ~ D 
EMOTIONAL STABILlTY - ~ ~ 
SELF CONTROL - 1m p 
SELF CONFIDENCE - ~p 
ADJUSTED - ~~'4 
CRAZY cli1 ~ 
I. I I I 7 . I I 
.. 1.5 2 •. 0 
I I I 
.3 .o 4 •. 0 5.0 
I I 
6.0 7.0 
•••• represents evaluation factor scores (good (1) - bad (7)) 
&:-~"'>'>">N represents activity factor scores (active (1) - passive (7)) 
____ __. represents potency factor scores (~trong (1) - weak (7)) 
The scale is a general seven point semantic. differential scale 
Figure 1. Bar Qraph of Average _Factor ·Scores for Each Concept in 
Table VIL Each Bar Represents an Interval which 
Includes the Average Factor Score for Each Group 
Figure 1 was designed to illustrate graphically the connotative 
meaning of each concept while ign6ring differences in meaning between 
groups. It is reasonable to ignore group differences for two reasons: 
(1) there was no statistical differences in ~onnotative meaning for· 
four 'Of the six concepts and (2) when the meaning of a concept wa·s 
different for two groups, the magnitude of the difference was not 
large enough to make a meaningful verbal distinction. 
If the .reader-will accept the assumption that for practical pur-
poses the three groups of subjects had similar meanings for each concept, 
then the factor scores for each group of subjects 'ca.n be· averaged 
together. The midpoint of each bar graph gives a rough approximation 
to this group average. 
If the reader will look at. the .. midpoint of the bar graph for the 
evalatuion dimension, he will notice that.five of the six concepts 
cluster about .the point 2.1, .and· that the evaluat.ion dimen.sion, for 
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all five .concepts, could adequately. be.described as "moderately good." 
(The -quantity 2 .1 is ac.tually the grand mean for all concepts on the 
evaluation .dimension, excluding. tl1,e concept CRAZY;) A similar analysis 
could be performed· for the remaining .two dimensions. 
Figure. 1 indicateE(I that the con·cept CRAZY .has a distinctly different 
meaning from the. other five concepts.· Therefore,. the.concepts othe; than 
CRAZY can be grouped together-to form.a clu$ter of similar concepts; 
this cluster· will be referred to. as. clu~ter .one •. The cc;mcept CRAZY 
can be placed in a cluste:i;" by itself which will be :referred to as 
cluster two. The grand means for each dimension in cluster one are: 
Evaluation (2 .11), Activity .(3 .11), and Potency (3. 64); the grand 
means for each dimension of clu$ter two are: Evaluation (5.46), 
Activity .(4.13) • and Potency (3.83). 
These grand means provide. an e:i:tcellent way to verbally describe 
the approximate connotative meani'!l,g of the ·conce1;>ts used in the s~antic 
differential. Grand means of 1. 0 or 7. 0 will be described as "very X". 
Grand means of 2~0 or 6.0 will be described .as ·."moderately xu and 3.0 
or 5.0 as "slightly X." · Osgood, Suci, and Tann..enbaum (1957) suggest 
that scores which cluster -around 4.0 are·meaningless. to the ·subject. 
The concepts in cluster one resem:ble Jahoda ~s (1958) concept of positive 
mental health; clustei; one.will ·be referred to as Positive Mental 
Health.. Cluster .two will be referr.ed to as Crazy. 
Thus the subjects from all three grotlps perceived Positive Mental 
Health as moderately good (2.11) and slightly .active· (3.11); it was 
\ ! -'j 
not meaningful to the subjects to describe .Positive .Mental Health in 
terms of the '.potency dililension (3 .. 64), i.e., Positive .Mental Health · 
was not perceived as being either strong or weak. The subjects per-
ceiv.ed Crazy as slightly to moderately bad (5.46). The potency (3.83) 
and activity· dimeils.ions (4.13). of Crazy were not meaningful to the 
subjects. 
The reader Cijn·assign the above word.values to the factor scores· 
from Table VI.· ~en this is.done, the.above verbal descripti~n fits 
fifty of. the .fifty-four observat:Lons 'in Table VI. The four observa-
tions which do not fit the apove verbal description are only in error 
by half of a scale unit. Thus. the above verbal description provides 
a good summary of the datawith only a small loss in accuracy. 
Summary of Results 
This analysis produced three types of results:. (1) comparison 
of the meaning of concepts between and within the three groups of sub-
jects; (2) comparison of the .con·ceptual structure of the .three. groups 
of subjects; and (3) a description 9f the conndtative meanings of 
the ·"mental .. health related terms. 11 
Comparisons of Concepts Between and Within ~roups 
Hypothesis .one (There will be no difference between groups of 
subjects ·in. the connotative meanings of. each concept.) was rejec.ted · 
at the .OS significance leve.l wit.h ·24 degrees of freedom •. · It was 
concluded that Engineering, Education, and Business subjei::t·s .have 
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different connotative meanings . for the concep.ts MENTAL HEALTH and 
CRAZY.. There was. no difference between the. three groups in. the cqnnota-
tive meanings of EMOTIONAL STABILITY, SELF CONFI_DENCE, SELF CONTROL and 
ADJUSTED. 
Th_e three D matrices in. Table V provide ·a qualitative indication . 
that .witpin each group of subj:ects, MENTAL HEALTH,· EMOTIONAL· STABILITY, 
SELF CONTROL, SELF CONFIDENCE,.and-ADJUSTED all have similar connotative 
meanings •. Within.each group of. subjects CRAZY.1:ias a connotative meaning 
which is different fro_m the other five concepts.· 
Comparisons Betweez:i Conce:ptual Structures 
The set· ·of factor ·SCQres ,for a. cc:>nc~pt are the coordinates for 
that cc;mcept as .a point in .semantic .space. The pattern of these concept 
points-in semantic space represents the conceptua,.l structure of a group 
or of an individual. 
Hypothesis .. two. (The conceptual, structure ·.of me,ntal health concepts 
will be ,different, i.e. unqorrelated, for, each group.) was-rejected at, 
the .0001 significance level, with 14 degrees of ,freedom. Thus it is _ 
concluded that the conceptua.l ·str.uctures for all three groups of. sub-
jects are very similar. 
When you consider that ,these groups of. subjects have different 
professional bac~rounds and di1:1similar connotative meanings for 
some concepts, it is .surprising to find conceptual str.uctures which are 
so sim.ilar. These observations indicate that each group of subjects 
employs 1essentially the .same frame of reference· in making judgments 
abo\,lt ·"mental. health concepts," i.,e., they -have the same set of values;, 
they make the -same types of discriminations-with respect to "mental· 
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health." For example, if two people share the same frame of reference, 
they will judge things by . the same standards or same values.. Thus in 
choosing a leader they might agree that a leader, should be strong, 
dynamic, and creative; but they are still likely to rate two leaders 
differently because they perceive the two leaders differently, not 
because their frames of reference are different~· 
Description of.the Meaning of "Mental Health Terms" 
The factor scores in Table VI give the .most ,specific descriptions 
of the connotative meanings of all concepts. Howev~r, it is difficult 
to make verbal distinctions between such factor scores as 2.05 and 2.30. 
Figure 1 was designed to illustrate the factor scores in Table VI and 
also to provide the basis, for a more parsimonious description of the 
factor scores. 
Figure 1 ignores between group .differences and illustrates how 
grand means for the three semantic di.fferential dimensions provide a 
more parsimonious description of conn9tative meaning. Between group 
differences can be ignored for .two re.asons: (1) there was no difference 
in meaning for four .of the .six concepts and (2) where a difference in 
meaning between groups existe.d, the magnitude of the difference was 
not large enough to make a meaningful verbal dis.tinction between the 
two group's connotative meanings. 
Inspection of Table VI and Figure 1 revealed that the six.concepts 
could be divided into two clusters. of concepts. Cluster one was called 
Positive Mental Health and included all the .concepts except CRAZY. 
Cluster two contained only the concept CRAZY and thus was, called Crazy. 
Grand means for each dimension and each cluster were computed. The 
grand means le~d to the following description of the connotative . 
meaning of the "mental health relate,d concepts • ..'' The subjects i-n all 
three groups perceived Positive Mental Health as "moderately .good" 
(2 .11) and "slightly ac.tive" (3 .11) •. Positive Mental Health was not 
perceived as either .strong or -weak by. the subjects, i.e., th.e -
potency dimension (3.64) was meaningless in relation to the Positive 
. - . 
Mental Health cluster .. The subjects,·perceived Crazy as "slightly 
to moderately bad" (5.46); the potency (3.83 and activity _dimensions 




The main purpos~- of th.e present study was to determine if Education 
graduate students, Business graduate students; and Engineering graduate 
students have: different .connotative meanings for a set· of mental health 
related concepts. If these groups ,of-students do have different meanings 
for mental health terms, then it suggests that mental health professiorl-
als might have difficulty working w:i,th indiv;i.duals from these groups· 
because they do not·share a common frame of reference. 
In general the results of -.the present st1.1:dy suggest that the thr~e · 
groups of stu,dent;:s do .. have different connotative meanings for some 
concepts, e.g. , MENTAL HEALTH. and CRAZY. However, these groups shared 
the sal,Ile meaning for four of the six concepts, i.e., EMOTIONAL STABILITY, 
SELF CONFIDENCE, SELF CONTROL -.and ADJUSTED. Will this difference in 
connotative meaning cl;l,use a communication problem for mental health 
professionals? Tw~ lines of evidence lead the present author to 
believe that-these pe;rceptual differences .will not cause a communication 
problem. 
The first line of evidence.is contaiqed in Table VI; observe the 
average factor scores· of each group for MENT,!\L HEALTH and CRAZY. These 
factor scoJ;'es are-significantly different for each group.of students 
as :measqred by ·a x2 text of indepeµd~nce •. For- example,. the Busines.s ·· 
MEN.TAL ·HEALTH Evaluat_ion faatqr -scare (2.01) is significantly .different 
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from the Education MENTAL HEAI..'J;H Evaluation factor score (2.50). But· 
note, that :these factor scores are of the same magni.tud.e as the other 
concepts... That is, .there is not . a wide discrepency · in the perceptions · 
of the three groups. with regar.d to MENTAL.· HEALTH.· The three gri;,ups 
are in general agreement that MENTALi HEALTH is ''moderately good," 
despite. the _fact that there is a significant difference in meaning 
for the ,thre~ groups. If the Bu'?iness subjects ·perceived MENTAL HEALTH 
"very ·good," and Education students perceived MENTAL HEALTH as "very 
bad," then, co!lllllunic'ation problems about MENTAL HEAI/l'H would be likely 
to occur. 
Thus the data in Table VI suggest that t~e discrepancies in percept-
ion observed between the ·three groups are not large enough·to cause 
practical pro.blell',s. 
The second line of evidence-is drawn from the,results of hypothesis 
two. When this hypo thesis was .. tested, it wa.s '.. founq. that the · three 
groups of stu4ents had -very-similar conceptual structures of mental 
health concepts. This -indicat,es that the three groups of students 
have essentially the same frame-of reference for mental health .concepts •. 
This similarity Cqn onl,y aid in the ·connnunication process .• 
Relati.on of Findings td Previous Resea;-ch 
The author. ;found no reseaJ::'.ch which _related directly to the research 
hypotheses. However, ,the two clusters of concepts which were formed 
offer _some support for Wright's (1971) investigation., Because. the con-
cepts in cluster one were. similar .to ·the concepts whi_ch Jahoda (1959) 
used to desc.J;'ibe her cqncept ·of !'Positive Mental Health, 11 this cluster · 
was called Positive Mental Health, e.g., SELF. CONTROL is similar to 
"autonomy," SELF CONFIDENCE is similar to "self perception," ADJUSTED 
and EMOTIONAL STABILITY are similar to "integration." 
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Wright (1971) tried to verify Jahoda's six characteristics empiri-
cally. He showed that Jahoda's six characteristics could be represented 
by two independent factors. Six of Jahoda's characteristics collapsed 
into the two factors found by Wright (1971), but Wright could not find 
any factor which represented Jahoda's. characteristic of "integration." 
The present study reduced the five Mental.Health Concepts to one cluster 
as ,opposed to the two factors which Wright (1971) found. The reader 
should be reminded that this is a very gross type of support for Wright 
(1971). The two studies had very diffe~ent methodologies and worked 
with two different types of data, Le., connotative meaning as opposed 
to sociometric-behavioral data. 
Implications and Future Research 
All of the concepts in cluster one were positively evaluated. This 
suggests that subjects from these groups might be motivated to work to-
ward these concepts. If this were true, these subjects might help set 
up primary prevention programs in the community or have emotional 
checkups for themselves and their families. These subjects seem to 
value "positive mental health;" this attitude should make it easier 
for them to learn new mental health behaviors .. 
A positive attitude toward mental health should aid in the process 
of improving mental health. However, it needs to.be determined how 
much it will aid. For example, is factual information about mental 
health, e.g., from the newspaper, enough to get·the person to change 
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his behavior?. Or .would group or individual counseling also be necessary? 
The.se are important questions. for future research. 
Future research should also.be directed toward broadening the areas 
in which mental health concepts are applied. For example, mental health 
principles are rarely utilized in engineering, despite the fact that 
they have many:potential uses. Industrial engineers design machines 
and factories so that; theY. are efficient and safe; ·aesthetic criteria . 
are also used. Mental health .princip;I.es could also. be used as criteria; 
many environmental. stresses could be designed out of existence if mental 
health were a criter.ion,. e.g., no_ise levels,- monotcmous work, jet lag. 
for executives, the bio-rythmic,imbalances caused by night shifts. 
Civ.il engineers design public .buildings and public works like 
roads and parks.. Much basic research. ne~ds to be done in this area before 
mental.health principles can be applied. For example, do the shaP,es of 
rooms or buildings have. an ej;fect upon tem~ion .levels? Would a public 
park nearby help a person.to relax? What effect will an urban renewal 
project have upon,the enJ.Otional health of the resident? 
Men,tal health .principles could also be.used as criteria for manage-. 
ment decisions .•. For example, what effect· will company relocation have 
upon the employees 1 .morale? Psychological sick days could be recognized 
as legitate reasc:ms :for staying home_ •. · Str,ess levels in many execu.tive 
positions ·could be reduced by redefining .the job demands to include•non-
stressful and relaxing functions. 
The pres,ent st~c;ly assumed that .mental health communicat.ion problems 
were based.'.918inly upon differences 1in.connotative meanings. Future· 
researc)l shoµld investigate differences in. denotative meaning as well as. 
connotative ,meaning to assess tb.e effects of each upon commut;1.ication. 
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The data from the present stt.Jdy might have been improved by using a 
different set of sub~ects or by using two sets of subjects to evaluate 
two different aspects or dimensions of group differences. The present 
study evaluated highly educated subjects onthe dimension of familiarity 
with the concepts. Future research should also· evaluate the .education 
dimension at.the same time. This ·would allow the investigator to evalu-
ate the effect that education has on the ·general familiarity .of concepts. 
The present study raised three important questions which need to 
be answered before practical applications will result from work in this 
area: 
. 1. Frequent experience or use of a concept will speed up the, 
process of concept formation a,nd produce a concept which is 
highly differentiated with respect to denotative meaning. 
Does the same process of concept formation work to differentiate 
connotative meaning? 
2. How far apart in connotative ~taning do two concepts h;:iye•to 
be before there is difficulty in communication? Also, how 
far apart in meaning do two .denotative concepts have to be 
before'there is difficulty in communication? 
3. When people share the. same frame of reference, does this· 
enhancE;1 their ability to communicat.e within this frame of 
reference? 
Limitations of Study 
The major limitation of the present study was the sampling procedure 
for subjects. Although the .present author believes that the graduate 
students used in the study ·provide an adequate.approximation of the· 
60 
target,population, i.e., professional businessmen, educators, and engi-
neers working in their respective fields, the conclusions from the 
present study can only be applied to the survey population, i.e., gradu-
ate students from Oklah_oma Stat~ University in the fields of Education, 
Engineering, and Busiµess. The present author believes that future 
studies, of this nature should sample directly from the populations of 
inter~st. 
Two extraneous variables which could have influenced the results 
of the present.study were sex .and education. Sex_coulcj. not _be controlled 
for because of the li!llited number .of women engineers. Educational level 
could nqt -be controlled because, of the narrow limits -of the survey 
population, i.e., graduate students.. By ,definition these subjects will 
have a bachelor's degree and not a doctoral degree. 
Due to the results _of the cluster analysis .the present author does. 
not believe that the concepts chosen for. the semantic -differential 
covered the.entire semantic ·space of "mental health related terms." 
Future research should include mo:re concepts in the .semantic .differen-
tial, perhaps as many as twenty and should include a wider variety of. 
concepts. 
Fi~ally, one aspect of phase one needs to_ be called to the reader's 
attention because it limits the generalizability of the present study 
and also suggests a direction for .future research. During phase .one 
the present author observed a good deal of variability in the attitud.es 
with which the professors. approached the ·task of completing the Q-sort. 
None of the Education professors felt that the Q-sort would be difficult 
to complete; however, two education professors did not complete the 
Q-sort because they did not have the time. 
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In general, both the Business and Engineering professors appeared 
intimidated by the Q-sort task. They seemed to be insecure about.work-
ing with the cqncept of mental heal.th rather than insecure about using 
the Q-sort technique which was-unfamiliar to them. Many of these 
professors refused to t&ke the q,-sort. saying that they didn't know 
anything about mental health. They still refused even when it was 
explained that.the study was interested in the laymen's opinion, not 
an e~pert opinion. 
The-attitudes of these professors toward mental he&lth is in sharp 
contrast to the -attitudes of the graduate students who took the semantic·· 
differential. The graduate stuclents from all three fields cooperated 
with the experimenter and none.of them mentioned that they lacked 
expertise in the area of mental healtl)., 
These contrasting attitudes can be explained by the nature of the 
tasks which the two sets of subj ect;.s ·performed. The semantic differen-
tial is a str\,lctured task with limited responses; structured tasks 
are usually much less_ anxiety producing than unstructured tasks. The 
Q-sort.is an unstructured task with unlimited response possibilities. 
There were only a few between group differences in meaning on the 
semantic differential; the above observation suggests that if connota-
tive meaning was measured by a more.unstructured task than the seman-
tic differential, that the_between group d:i.fferences in connotative 
meaning might be larger, i.e. , between group differences were min:i.mized 
by the structured nature of the semantic d:i.ffe,rential. A more unstruc-
tured task might. maximiz,e .the between group differences. So the .reader· 
is reminded to be.cautious .in interpreting the results of the present. 




Mental.health professionals will. need to deal_ with many different 
kinds of people in the course of establishing and maintaining a commu-1;1.ity . 
mental health ,center. The success c,f the center .will depend lar~!illY 
upon the cooperation of community leaders; thus d.t is important that the, 
mental _health profess_ionals at the .center be able _to communicate 
effectively with the community .leaders. If commun:J,ty leaders share a 
common·connotativ~ meaning for "mental health," the communication process 
will be enhanced. Or if "mental .health" has different connotative mean-
ings for different groups in the community~ then the _mental health 
professionals could use this knowledge-to fill in the gaps in communica-; 
tion and augment the communication process. 
The main purpose. of tQe ·present. study was to determine if three 
groups of potential community lead_ers. had different connotative meanings 
for a set of mental health related concepts. A difference in connotatiye 
meanings might indicate a connm1nication problem _because the subjects· 
perceive the concepts differently~ 
HypotQeses 
Two major hypotheses were test;ed _in the,present st:udy; however, 
these hypotheses.can be summarized into two ma:J,n questions: (1) Do 
the thre~ groups of subjects have_ sim:J.lar connotative meanings for 
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mental health concepts, i.e. do the subjects perceive mental health in 
the same way? and (2) Do the three groups of subjects have,similar con~ 
ceptual structures of mental health, i.e., do the subjects share the 
same frame of'reference for mental health concepts? 
Target Population and Method of Sampling 
The target population for the present study was businessmen, ·engi-
neers, and educator~ in the Stillwater area during the summer of 1974. 
Thirty subjects from each group was the desired sample size. It would 
have been extremely difficult to obtain this many subjects from each 
group because of the size of Stillwater and because it was summer. 
Thus the survey population only approximated the target population. 
The survey population consisted of three ,professors from each of the 
Colleges of Business, Education and Engineering for phase one and 
approximately 30 graduate students ·from each of the Colleges of 
Business (29), Education (32), and Engineering (29) for phase two. 
Treatment and Design 
A semantic ·differential was used to measure the connotative meanings 
of mental health related concepts for the three groups of subjects used 
in phase two. Six mental health. concepts were chosen with a Q sort 
technique for use in the semantic.differential during phase one. The 
Q-sort :was administered to three professors from each of three colleges 
mentioned above. The Q-sort used was ·modified in order to obtain mean-
ingful results. The six concepts chosen were: MENTAL HEALTH, EMOTIONAL 
STABILITY, SELF CONFIDENCE, SELF CONTROL, ADJUSTED, and CRAZY. 
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During phase two the scales for the semantic differential were 
select.ed by the experimenter .and the semantic differential instrument 
was constructed and administered. to the three groups of subjects. The 
semantic differential was administered to the subjects either at the 
beginning or end of a class period; the subjects took from five to ten 
minutes to complete the instrument. (Note·, subjects for both phase one 
and phase two were volunteers.) 
Results 
The connotative meaning for four of the concepts used in the 
analysis was similar for each group, i.e., all of the subjects had 
similar perceptions. of EMOTIONAL STABILITY, SELF CONTROL, SELF CONFIDENCE 
and ADJUSTED for the three dimensions,measured by the semantic differ-
2 
ential: Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. (X less than 27.3 with 24 
d.f., observed significance level' greater than .20). However, the three 
groups perceived MENTAL HEALTH and CRAZY differently on the dimensions 
measured (observed significance level. less than .05). 
The conceptual structures of mental health for each group were 
very similar (Rho at least .9908). This indicates that the subjects 
share the same frame of reference for mental health concepts. 
Dis.cuss ion 
The above results indicate. that the three groups of subjects per-
ceive some concepts differently, but that these three groups of subjects 
all use the same frame of reference when they are using mental health 
concepts, ·i.e., they use the same values and make the same alkl.ds of 
discriminations. Thus these three groups of subjects all make the same 
kinds of judgments, but arrive at different judgments because they 
perceive the mental health situation differently. 
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The present author conclud~s that these perceptual differences, i.e. 
differences in connotative meanings, will not cause difficulty in 
communication about mental heal.tl,. between the three different groups 
of subjects because the magnitude of differences in meaning is not 
very large in a practical sense even though the difference is, statis-
tically significant. 
The greatest limitation of the present study is the lack of corres-
pondence between. the survey population and the target population. The 
results of the present study can.only be generalized to the survey 
population, i.e., graduate students in the Colleges of Business, Engi-
neering, and Education at Oklahoma State University. 
Educational ~nd psychological research has repeatedly found that 
these~ of .the subject can be a major determinant in the subject's 
performance. It is unfortunqte that the samples of subjects selected 
for the present experiment did not contain enough females to explore 
a sex difference in performance; this places a major limitation on 
the findings. 
The sub~ects from all three groups placed a positive evaluation 
on the Positiv:e Mental Health cluster of concepts, i.e., these subjects 
held a positive attitude toward mental health. This attitude should 
aid them in improving their mental health. Future research should inves-
tigate the degree to which a positive attitude or a negative attitude 
toward mental health influences the rate of chahge of the subject's. 
behavior in various mental health settings, e.g., factual information· 
about mental health, group counseling, and individual counseling. 
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Future research should also be directed toward broadening the areas 
in which mental health concepts are applied, e.g., criteria for 
industrial or civil engineering projects or as criteria for management 
or personnel policies. 
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APPENDIX A 




The pur.pose of the following el:periment is to generate a list of 
terms which are related .to the concept "Mental Health." In the space 
provided on page 2, write every word which you can think of which is 
related to "Mental Health." Your ,list should look something like a 
thesaurus entry for the term "Mental Health." Both synonyms and words 
other than synonyms should be.included in your list. 
For example, if the experimental concept were "House," you might· 
include synonyms such as domicile, dwelling, home, abode, habitation. 
Or you might include related terms .which are types of houses, e.g. 
cottage, bungalow, mansion, shack, shanty, hut. , Or .you might include 
terms which do not refer to the ·structural properties of a house, 
but to other properties of a house, e.g., ancestry, lineage, family, 
legislature, firm, organization, company. 
The central purpose is to generate a list of terms which are 
related to the concept of "Mental Health." You want to examine 
"Mental Health" from all aspects and to look at it from several 
different perspectives.- You might start your list by writing down 
as many synonyms for "Mental Health" as you can think of. Then you 
might look at eac,h of these synonyms and find words which are related 
to.them. 
When you have written all the terms which. you can think of which 
are relatec'.l to "Mental ,Health," read the. instructions for part,2. Now 
turn to page 2 and begin your list in the space provided at the top 
of the page. 
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page 2 Name: 
Write your answers to part 1 here. 
Part 2: 
Take all the terms which you have listed in part 1 (above), and separate these terms into as many 
groups as you think necessary. Group together those words which you think belong together. If a word 
dbes not belong in any'of your groups, then place it in a new group by itself. For example, shack, 
shanty, and hut might all be classed together in one group. (Note, the group headings below are only 
for your convenience; you do not have.to put a term in each group. Use only as many groups as you need; 
if necessary you may make more than 10 groups by placing your group on the back of this page.) 






Now, look at the words you have placed in each of your groups. 
Notice how the words in each group seem similar. Now what word or 
phrase could you use to describe all the terms in group 1. Write this 
word or phrase in the space provided at the bottom of this page. 
Now do the same thing for each of the remaining groups on page 2. 


























THE GROUP NAMES FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH CONCEPTS PRODUCED BY·· 




1. popular descriptions _of mental disorders 
2. persons with mental disorders 
3. places for treatment of mental disorders 
4. attitudes relating to mental health 
5. persons involved in treatment of people with mental disorders 
6. types of mental disorder 
7. types of treatment for mental disorder 
8. human relations needs and characteristics 
9. characteristics ,of a posi·tive self i~ge 
10. mental competence 
11. mental alertness and perseverence 
12. mental confidence and stability: freedom to question and examine 
13. constructive mental abilities 





4. informal class. descriptors 
5. formal class. descriptors 
6. feelings about· self 
7. reactions 
8. personality characteristics 





14. fully functioning 
Engineering 
1. conditions of good mental health 
2. conditions of bad mental health 
3. means of overcoming problems or attaining good mental health 
4. places for help 
5. fields or organizations associated with mental health 
6. maturity, strength, resistence to adversity 
7. drive 
8. control of emotions 
9. generosity to others 
10. ability to interact socially 




A LIST OF MENTAL HEALTH RELATED TERMS 
COMPILED FROM THE Q SORT RESPONSES 






3. well adjusted 
4. s:!-ck 
5. nuts problem 



















25. positive outlook 
26. ability to work in peer groups 
27. capable of accepti~g criticism 

























































































































































































































38. acceptance of self 
39. good self-concept 
40. positive attitude 
41. contentment 





47. emotional stability 
48. accepts the inevitable 
49. absence of neurosis 





















doesn't brood over mistakes 
dares to try 
unafraid to meet realities 
accepts challenge 
clear set of values 
capacity to love 
interest in others 
happy 
pleasant 









THE SEMANTIC DIFFE~NTIAL 
OF MENTAL HEALTH CONCEPTS 
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The purpose of this study is to measure the meaning certain concepts have 
for different people. You are being asked to rate six concepts on a 
series of descriptive scales. In taking this test, please make your 
judgments on the basis of what these concepts mean to you. On the 
next three pages you will find six concepts. Beneath each concept you 
will find a.set of descriptive scales. You are to rate each concept 
on each of the scales. 
Here is how you are to use. the scales. For example, lets rate 
the concept HITLER on the following scales. If you feel that HITLER 
is very closely related to one end of the scale, then you should place 
your checkmark as follows:· 
1 1. fair x unfair· 
1 -2 3 4 5 6 7 
or 
7 1. fair .. x unfair· 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Write the number under your answer in the space at the left. 
If you feel that HITLER is quite closely related to one or the 
other end of the scale (but not extremely) should place your checkmark 
as follows. 
2 2. stron_g--,.. ___ x ________ ..,..... ______ ~--.,.,_.weak 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
or 
6 2. strong·---------'"---------------X _____ weak 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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If~ HITLER seems only slightly related to one side as opposed to 
the other side (but is not really neutra;t.), then you should check as 
follows: 
x passive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
or 
x : passive 
2 3 4 5· 6 7 
5 3. active ~1--__,.__..__,.__..___,__....,..,. ____,. __ ..,..,._,. 
The direction toward which you check, of course, depends upon 
which of the two end.s .of the scale seem most characteristic of the 
concept which you are judging. 
If you -consi<;ier the concept to be .neutral on the scale, i.e., 
both sides of the scale equally associated with the concept, or if the 
scale is completely irrelevant, it.e., unrelated to the concept, then 
you should place your check.mark in the middle space. 
4 4. safe X dangerous 
--1~-2---3---4,----5--~6--~7,-
IMPORTANT 
1. Place your checkmark in the middle of spaces, not on the 
boundaries. 
this not this 
safe X X dangerous 
~__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.__,.~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Be sure you check every scale for every concept. 
3. Never put .more than one check.mark on a single sc.ale. 
Work. at fairly high speed through this test. Do not worry or 
puzzle over individual items. It is your first impression, the. 
immediate feelings about the items, that we want. On the other hand, 
please do not·be careless, because we want your.true impressions, 
Now turn to page three and begin the test. 
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MENTAL HEALTH 
1. good . . . bad . . -- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. fast slow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. heavy light 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. valuable worthless 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. rugged delicate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. active assive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. pleasant unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. strong weak 
1 2 3 4 5.'" 6 7 
9. hot cold 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. ferocious eaceful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. sharp dull 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. beautiful ugly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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EMOTIONAL STABILITY 
13. good bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. fast slow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. heavy light 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. valuable worthless 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. rugged delicate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. active · assive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. pleasant unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. strong wea.k 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. hot cold 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. ferocious eaceful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. sharp dull 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. beautiful ugly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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SELF CONTROL 
25. good bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. fast slow 
' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. heavy light 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. valuable worthless 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. rugged delicate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. active passive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. pleasant·. unpleasant 
1 2 3. 4 5 6 7 
32. str-ong · weak 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. hot· co.ld 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. ferocious pe1aceful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_35 •. sharp dull 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. beautiful ugly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




37. good . bad . . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
· 38. fast sLow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. heavy light 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 . 
40. valuable··· worthless 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. rugg~d delicate 
1 2 3 4· 5 6 7 
42. act,ive passive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43. pleasant. unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 61' 7 
44. strong weak 
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45. hot : . co,ld 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46. ferocitilus . eaceful . . 
1 2 3 ·4 5 6 7 
47. sharp dull 
1 2: 3 4 5 6 7 
48. bea1.1,tiful ugly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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ADJUSTED 
49. good bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
50. fast slow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51. heavy light 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52. valuable worthless 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
53. ,:-ugged delicate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
54. active assive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
55. pleasant unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
56. strong weak 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
57. hot cold 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
58. ferocious eaceful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
59. sharp dull 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
60. beautiful ugly 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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CRAZY (INSANE) 
61. good bad 
1 2 .3 4 5 6 7 
62. fast slow 
. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
63. heavy light. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
64. valuable worthless 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_65. rugged delicate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
66. active assive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 ·7 
67. pleasant unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
68. strong weak 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
69. h0t . cold 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
70. ferocious eaceful 
. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
71. sharp dull 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
72. beautiful ugly 
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